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The Strange Non-Death of Employer and Business Associations: An Analysis of 
their Representativeness and Activities in Western European Countries 
 
Abstract 
Against the background that corporatism is on the decline in recent decades, one could 
expect that the representativeness of employer and business associations is also 
declining. In this article it is argued and shown that, contrary to this expectation, this 
decline is not observable for employers and business associations. So the question arises 
as to whether employer and business associations are simply relics of a different era 
with no longer any purpose. Using a cross-national approach it is shown that by 
adapting their organizational structure as well as their activities to the changing needs of 
business, employers and business organizations are as ‘strong’ and active nowadays as 
ever.  
Keywords 
employer associations, collective bargaining, industrial relations, interest groups, 
corporatism  
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The Strange Non-Death of Employer and Business Associations: An Analysis of 
their Representativeness and Activities in Western European Countries 
 
Introduction  
 
Employer and business associations (EBAs) are special interest organisations and 
represent the product and labour market interests of business vis-á-vis the state and 
trade unions. While the representation of product market interests refers to the interests 
of business as customers and suppliers of goods and services in the production process 
and chain, the representation of labour market interests refers to the interests of business 
as employers. Interest associations which concentrate exclusively on product market 
interests of business are often defined as “pure” business or trade associations while 
associations focusing exclusively on labour market interests are usually defined as 
employers’ associations (e.g., Traxler, 2000). In this paper we concentrate on the labour 
market side which manifests itself via the engagement of associations in collective 
bargaining as well as in various forms of concertations and consultations on labour 
market issues with state authorities. Nowadays, in Western Europe, almost no pure 
employers’ associations exist any longer so we augment our analysis to mixed 
organisations which subsume the product and labour market interests of business, i.e. to 
EBAs.  
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Representative and encompassing EBAs are often an integral part of 
socioeconomic policymaking in many Western European countries and their activities 
often affect many policy areas in an economy. Many EBAs in Western Europe are also 
“historically” evolved interest groups (e.g., Crouch, 1993). In fact many EBAs have a 
long history and their emergence dates back to the rise of corporatism, collective 
bargaining and, in particular, to the increasing strength of trade unions, i.e. their roots 
lie in the 19th century.  
The vast majority of research on EBAs formation and representativeness stems 
from the seminal work of Olson (1965, 1982) and is based on the reasoning that 
narrowly tailored interest organizations are more effective than encompassing 
organizations which aim to represent the interests of a large cross-section of 
constituents. In industrial relations research, EBAs received significantly less attention 
than trade unions even though their “relevance” for the economy and society, for 
collective bargaining and other forms of collective interest representation is relatively 
similar. This is different in other academic disciplines which are also interested in 
business interest groups and the actions and organizational characteristics are well 
analysed. But the difference is that the latter stream of research concentrates more on 
business interest groups, such as, in particular, lobbying organizations and their 
activities vis-à-vis state authorities on law and policy making as well as vis-à-vis other 
business organizations. The activities of these analysed organizations focused on the 
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representation of the interests of their constituents’ on the product market, for example 
on influencing industrial and trade policies vis-à-vis various state authorities (e.g., 
Bernhagen, 2013; Grote et al., 2008; Ronit and Schneider, 2000). The bottom line is that 
both in industrial relations research and in other disciplines less attention has been given 
in research to EBAs as regards their labour market scope. This is surprising since these 
EBAs are encompassing organisations which represent both labour and product market 
interests of their constituencies appear to challenge Olson’s (1965) reasoning.  
EBAs exist in all Western European countries and in particular peak EBAs, are 
usually highly encompassing interest groups who represent the interests of business, i.e. 
of companies in different sectors and industries as well as from different regions in a 
country, on the product and labour market. Despite their high degree of 
encompassment, they are usually highly representative and well organized for the 
domain in which they operate. This is reflected by their membership share, which on 
average across countries is high and very stable over time (e.g., Brandl and Lehr, 2015; 
European Commission, 2015). This high degree of representativeness is puzzling, as 
EBAs are burdened with the problem of collective action. Through their participation in 
collective bargaining as well as their aims to influence state authorities’ policy making, 
EBAs provide collective goods. Hence, EBAs are faced with the same problem of 
collective action as many other interest organizations (Traxler, 1999). The 
representativeness of EBAs is even more puzzling as changes in the socioeconomic 
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context over recent decades have challenged the role of EBAs, especially those that 
represent the labour market interests of their members. In particular, the decline of trade 
unionism (e.g., Molina and Rhodes, 2002) implies that there are less incentives for 
companies to join EBAs as there is decreasing need to counteract strong and serious 
trade union action. Moreover, whilst it is argued that the legitimacy of EBAs is heavily 
based on their function in collective bargaining (Traxler, 2004), increasingly open 
markets significantly reduced the benefits of nationally-confined collective bargaining 
for companies (Molina and Rhodes, 2002). The bottom line is that not only is the high 
representativeness of EBAs puzzling but also its overall stability over time.  
In this paper we leave aside questions of how “influential” EBAs are as well as 
the effects of EBAs activities on the efficacy of economies and societies and instead 
concentrate in detail on the question of what makes EBAs highly representative, and 
why they have varied (or not) in Western European countries over time. More 
specifically, we analyse in detail the determinants of representativeness of the largest 
peak in Western European countries. In the following, we derive specific hypotheses 
which we test on the basis of unique and recent time series data which covers data for 
the following countries (and EBAs in brackets) over a period between 1973 and 2012: 
Austria (Austrian Federal Economic Chamber), Belgium (Federation of Enterprises in 
Belgium), Denmark (The Confederation of Danish Employers), Finland (Confederation 
of Finnish Industries), France (Movement of the Enterprises of France; since 1998 and 
7 
 
before National Council of the French Employers), Germany (Confederation of German 
Employers' Associations), Ireland  (The Irish Business and Employers Confederation; 
between 1986 and 1993 Federated Union of Employers), Italy (Confindustria), 
Netherlands (Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers; Confederation of 
Netherlands Employers between 1986 and 1994), Norway (Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise; Norwegian Employers’ Confederation until 1990), Spain (Spanish 
Confederation of Employers' Organizations), Switzerland (Swiss Employer 
Association), and the United Kingdom (Confederation of British Industry).  
In order to do so, we first elaborate the role of EBAs as providers of collective 
goods and the importance of their representativeness. In the following section we then 
present the hypotheses about the determinants of representativeness. We then outline the 
details of our research design, methods and data, and discuss the hypotheses tests. In the 
final section we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for the 
future development of EBAs. 
 
Employer and business associations: a relic of a different era?  
 
EBAs are special interest organizations and represent and promote the interests of 
business, visa-à-vis two main actors: trade unions and state authorities. The main arena 
for the representation of interests vis-à-vis trade unions is in collective (wage) 
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bargaining whilst the arena for interaction with state authorities are institutionalized, i.e. 
regular, as well as ad hoc negotiations and consultations. The interactions with the state 
can be either tripartite, i.e. jointly with trade unions, or bipartite, i.e. without trade 
unions. Beside formal interactions with state authorities, EBAs are also traditionally 
involved in various forms of lobbying activities as are many other business interest 
groups. However, the forms of interaction differ significantly not only across countries, 
as well as over time, but also differ from country to country in the impact of the 
interactions on the promotion of interests (e.g., European Commission, 2015; Huemer et 
al., 1999). 
Many of today’s EBAs were founded as counter-organizations to trade unions 
with the main aim of counterbalancing the relative strength between “capital” and 
“labour” (Crouch, 1993). In the historical sequence of the formation of EBAs in 
Western Europe it can be clearly seen that EBAs were formed after trade unions. Thus 
employers reacted to trade union formation and activities by embarking on collective 
action only after unions had increased their strength and power (Traxler, 2000).  
In the course of time EBAs became part of the wider socioeconomic system of 
collective interest representation and even of public policy making (e.g., Crouch, 1993; 
Traxler, 1993). However, the form and intensity with which EBAs engaged in collective 
interest representation and public policy differed substantially across different countries. 
While in some countries their engagement in collective bargaining plays a relatively 
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unimportant role because few employees are covered by collective agreements (e.g., in 
Ireland and the UK), in other countries (e.g., in Belgium and Finland) almost all 
employees are affected. Thus the involvement of EBAs in collective bargaining has a 
widely varying effect but is a fundamental element of the countries’ income and wage 
policy (European Commission, 2015). As regards their interaction with state authorities 
there are also differences across countries. While in some countries EBAs are “only” 
consulted by state authorities on some policy matters on an infrequent and ad hoc basis 
(e.g., Italy and Portugal), in other countries EBAs are involved in the planning, 
implementation, and monitoring of many social and economic policies (e.g., Austria and 
the Netherlands). Even though it was sometimes argued that along with the “decline” of 
corporatism (e.g., Molina and Rhodes, 2002) the scope and intensity of EBA 
involvement weakened slightly over time there is evidence that since the advent of the 
economic crisis in Europe the involvement of EBAs in the public policy making agenda 
increased significantly again. This, however, includes both bi- and tripartite policy 
making (e.g., Doerflinger and Pulignano, 2015; Marginson and Galetto, 2016). The 
bottom line is that, in different countries, different institutional structures and 
institutions of business and employer interest representations emerged which differ 
significantly in their degree of “influence”.  
 
The organizational capability of EBAs 
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EBAs are a prime example of interest groups, and much academic attention has been 
directed towards understanding variations in the influence of interest groups (e.g., 
Doner and Schneider, 2000) as well as the macroeconomic consequences of this 
influence (e.g., Olson, 1982). The majority of these studies conclude that growing 
“influence” or “strength” of interest groups hinders economic performance, although the 
results depend very much on the choice of macroeconomic performance indicator, as 
well as on the definition of interest groups. However, a fundamental forgoing question 
still lacking adequate answers is how interest organizations, i.e. EBAs, achieve and 
maintain in the first place the organizational capability needed to realize influence.  
Since their early existence, EBAs are predominantly voluntary organizations 
whose legitimacy and organizational survival is tied to the willingness of members to 
join and support them (logic of membership). In the following, we will define the ability 
of organizations to organize their domain-specific segment of the labour market as their 
representativeness. Representativeness is crucial for the ability of any EBA to represent 
the interests of their members effectively, i.e. in order to influence other actors in the 
environment, in particular other parts of the business community, organized labour and 
the state (logic of influence). Although high representativeness is perhaps not a 
sufficient condition for EBA influence (Behrens and Helfen, 2009: 9), it is likely a 
necessary condition for them to be able to effectively represent their members on the 
11 
 
labour market and influence public policy (e.g., Coleman and Grant, 1988; Swank and 
Martin 2001). In any case, a low degree of representativeness would challenge the 
ability of EBAs to participate in public policy-making as the incentive for state 
authorities to involve EBAs in public policy rests heavily on the representativeness of 
the organizations as it enables a wide-ranging “closing of arms” between state and 
business (e.g., Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000). A high degree of representativeness 
enables EBAs to assert influence on state authorities via different channels, as it 
strengthens interest representation and opens the door to institutionalized and non-
institutionalized forms of policy making in which decisions on economic and social 
policies are made (e.g., Brandl and Lehr, 2015).  
The question of EBA representativeness is especially interesting given that the 
post-industrial era has seen a decline in trade unionism and increasing 
internationalization, seemingly defeating the purpose of EBAs and thus turning them 
into relics of a different era. Moreover, the successes of EBAs in maintaining their 
members is vexing in the light of the dominant collective action theoretical approach to 
interest groups (Olson, 1965). This is particularly the case for peak EBAs that represent 
the labour market interests of their members. These organizations are generally large 
and encompassing, as they represent companies, i.e. employers, across multiple 
economic sectors, companies of different sizes (small, medium and large companies), 
companies with different production systems and demands for different skills of their 
12 
 
employees as well as companies which are differently exposed to (international) 
competition. Collective action theory would suggest that this should severely limit their 
ability to organize. Selective incentives can overcome this problem (e.g., Helfen, 2011), 
but representation on the labour market dictates that peak EBAs predominantly engage 
in the delivery of collective goods in the form of collective agreements and in 
influencing labour market policy.   
 
The representativeness of employer and business associations: solid as a rock? 
 
In order to allow a country comparison of the representativeness, we use a common 
definition (European Commission, 2015) by defining representativeness as density of 
the largest peak EBA in a country, which is calculated as the ratio of all employees from 
member companies to the total number of employees in potential member companies. 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the distributions of EBA density in thirteen European 
countries for the period 1973 - 2012.  
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
 
The variation of density across countries is striking and confirms previous comparisons 
(e.g., Carley, 2010; European Commission, 2015). In Austria, density is highest due to 
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compulsory membership for companies. As regards the rest of the countries, in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Finland, and France density rates are relatively 
high while in the others, average density varies between approximately 30 and 40 per 
cent. As regards the development over time, literature reports relatively stable 
membership figures (e.g., Brandl and Lehr, 2015; Carley, 2010; Traxler, 2010). Figure 2 
shows the development of the average EBA density across these countries over time in 
the period 1973 - 2012.  
 
- Figure 2 about here - 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the average EBA density across countries remained 
relatively stable over time, as does the between-country variation. The latter finding is 
in contrast to the sometimes hypothesized convergence (e.g., Hyman, 2001; Keller, 
2003; Vos, 2006).  
However, this stability of aggregate density as well as of the between-country 
variation does not imply that densities have been stable within all individual countries. 
For example, in Denmark and Belgium, density rates increased over the past decades, 
whilst they decreased in Italy, Finland and France. In the following, we explain how 
shifts in the organizational characteristics of EBAs, their activities and the changing 
environment influenced the representativeness.  
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The determinants of membership representativeness  
 
The traditional application of Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action to EBAs can be 
summarized as follows. First, individual employers can best advance their own interests 
through collective action. Joining an EBA, which can subsequently participate in 
collective bargaining and policy formation and implementation, realizes this collective 
action. Second, employers that do not join the EBA and thus do not contribute to the 
collective action, can still take advantage of the goods that EBAs realize. This is 
because public policies guided by EBAs will benefit all employers, not only those that 
are members of the EBA. Similarly, collective agreements in some countries apply also 
to those employers that are not EBA members because collective agreements are 
centrally or sectorally negotiated and/or extended to apply to all relevant employers. 
Such extension practices of collective agreements are common practice in countries 
such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Portugal and Spain as well as being applied 
on an ad hoc basis in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands (e.g., European 
Commission, 2015). The collective action, i.e. joining an EBA, therefore constitutes 
primarily a collective good. Since joining an EBA requires employers to pay 
membership fees, each individual employer has an incentive to free-ride by not joining 
the EBA. Thus, third, selective incentives, i.e. private goods, are needed in order for 
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EBAs to convince employers to join them and thus reach sufficient densities to be 
representative.  
 Previous studies on EBA representativeness (e.g., Brandl and Lehr, 2015; Offe 
and Wiesenthal, 1980; Traxler, 2000, 2004) catalogued the consequences for density of 
EBAs providing selective incentives in the form of specific services that EBAs deliver 
to employers and the organizational structure EBAs develop to do this. However, these 
previous studies viewed EBAs as rather static organizations and paid limited attention to 
the possibility of EBAs adapting to their differing and changing socio-economic 
environments. Moreover, due to empirical limitations, previous studies were unable to 
simultaneously test and distinguish between more than a very limited set of hypotheses. 
The goal of the framework which we outline below is to add our new hypotheses to 
existing hypotheses and debates. We do not aim to replace previous analyses and 
hypotheses on the determinants of EBA representativeness but rather to augment and 
broaden the debate. Thus the new hypotheses will supplement previous theoretical 
reasoning and empirical studies. The unique empirical data used for this study allows us 
to analyse and test a larger set of hypotheses simultaneously and ascertain whether or 
not the new determinants which we consider in the hypotheses are able to provide any 
additional explanatory value or theoretical and empirical “surplus”. For the latter 
reasons we present and develop a set of very detailed and explicit hypotheses which 
enables us to assess each hypothesis directly, individually and explicitly.        
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In the following section, we therefore review arguments from previous studies 
and develop new propositions about the determinants of EBA density. For these new 
propositions, we will argue that the socio-economic conditions in which EBAs are 
embedded determine the needs of EBAs’ constituents, both in terms of the collective 
goods as well as in terms of the private goods, i.e. selective incentives, which EBAs 
have to provide in order to fulfil their purpose. We argue that the socio-economic 
environment differs across countries as well as over time so that different socio 
economic services, i.e. incentives have to be provided by EBAs in order to overcome 
the collective action problem they must face. We furthermore maintain that EBAs are in 
fact usually rather flexible and adaptive organizations that are able to shift their 
activities accordingly.   
We will group our hypotheses in two categories: in the first group we are 
presenting and discussing hypotheses (hypotheses 1 to 5) which (primarily) relate to 
contextual country differences and different socio-economic environments in which 
EBAs are embedded. The second category of hypotheses (hypotheses 6 to 9) refers 
(primarily) to the organisational structure and organisational activities EBAs undertake 
(or not). Even though the determinants of EBA density in both categories are not 
necessarily independent from each other, they can be distinguished in terms of their 
relevance regarding their ability to explain the level of EBA representativeness across 
country and the change of EBA density over time. In the empirical analysis we will 
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differentiate, investigate and test the relevance of determinants in their ability to explain 
differences between countries and the development over time separately and according 
to the grouping.   
 
Contextual influences on EBA density: explaining country differences  
 
Contextual factors can help explain differences in EBA density across countries, as well 
as developments in countries over time. One of the most prominent features of modern 
societies is their high and increasing level of economic internationalization. It has 
previously been argued that the globalization and internationalization of economic 
markets would negatively influence EBAs (e.g., Traxler, 2004). The argument was that 
increased competition would be at odds with the implied solidarity of collective action. 
This would hurt EBAs in particular, because their (potential) members are well 
equipped to act autonomously and/or move activities across borders thus devaluing 
centralization and the regulation of labour relations provided by EBAs. Taking 
economic openness as a measure for economic internationalization, it has therefore 
previously been hypothesized that the more open national economies are, the lower the 
density of the employers and business associations in these economies (H1a).  
 This proposition however is based on a static view of EBAs as organizations 
carrying out one particular set of tasks within the confines of the nation state. In fact, we 
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have ample evidence that EBAs change their structure and activities to adapt to 
challenges and take advantage of opportunities in their environment. Consequently we 
argue that economic openness in particular creates opportunities for EBAs to increase 
membership. This is because economic openness leads to a specific array of needs 
among (potential) member companies that EBAs can address. Openness coincides with 
increased international product market competition, which in turn leads to specialization 
across countries, high rates of innovation and increased short term pressures on the 
labour market. For employers, it is important that national labour markets are adjusted 
accordingly. Via collective bargaining, tripartite consultation, the consultation for and 
implementation of labour market reforms, EBAs are in a position to affect the 
composition and flexibility of labour supply. Companies have an incentive to join the 
associations in order to ensure their specific needs are taken into account and to take 
advantage of activities and services geared towards such needs. We shall further 
elaborate how this affects the impact of particular activities below. For now, assuming 
that EBAs successfully adapt to their economic environment, we argue against previous 
studies and propose that the more open economies are, the higher the density of EBAs in 
these economies (H1b).  
 We also argue that EBAs may provide an important protective function for 
employers against economic adversity. Especially in times of uncertainty and crisis, 
individual companies can join associations in order to take advantage of shared 
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information and coordination to offset these pressures. In addition, EBAs are channels 
of voice towards state authorities and trade unions facilitating joint strategies and 
compromises. This function is of particular importance when employers have to ensure 
their own organizational survival and prosperity in a hostile climate. We therefore 
propose that in times of economic downturn, the incentives to join EBAs increase and 
will test the hypothesis that economic growth is negatively associated with EBA density 
(H2).  
 Previous studies have hinted at several other contextual factors that may 
influence EBA density. For instance, it has been argued (e.g., Brandl and Lehr, 2015; 
Gladstone, 1984; Helfen, 2011; Traxler, 2010) that EBA density is particularly increased 
when the industrial relations system of a country comprises extension practices. Such 
practices entail that collective agreements are generally extended to apply even to those 
employers that did not engage in bargaining for the collective agreement. It has been 
argued that this benefits EBAs as it is assumed that employers who know that they will 
be bound by a collective agreement would rather join the EBA in order to have some 
influence, than not join and have no influence, on the content of the collective 
agreement. For this reason, we test the hypothesis that the existence of extension 
practices is associated with higher EBA density (H3).  
 Another contextual factor frequently (e.g., Crouch, 1993; Traxler, 2004) thought 
to positively influence EBA density is trade union membership density, because  
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employers facing more powerful trade unions will have more incentives to guard their 
interests against these unions, and hence be more willing to join EBAs. However, 
previous analyses (i.e., Traxler, 2004) have shown that the impact of trade union density 
on EBAs cannot be correctly understood without simultaneously taking into account the 
existence of extension practices in a country. This is because empirically, state-
sponsored selective incentives to join trade unions (e.g. unemployment benefits via 
unions) and state-sponsored selective incentives to join EBAs, i.e. extension practices, 
do not coincide in the same countries. We shall consequently test the interaction-
hypothesis that EBA density increases with trade union density, but only when extension 
practices are absent (H4).  
 A final contextual determinant of EBA density is the fragmentation of business 
interest representation system itself. The argument is that in highly fragmented systems 
where there are many EBAs, each EBA can specialize in serving a relatively narrow 
domain of employers. In this way, EBA interest representation is more likely to fit with 
the specific interests of the employers, which may vary significantly across the different 
domains of employers. Therefore, it can be expected that the more fragmented the 
system of business interest representation is, the higher the density of EBAs (H5). 
 
EBA-level influences on EBA density: organizational structure and activities  
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Besides contextual factors, EBAs themselves can have an influence on their density. 
Traxler (2000, 2010) argued that this can be achieved by undertaking reorganizations. 
Empirically, such reorganizations typically entail mergers between different EBAs, 
often between EBAs with a focus on labour market representation and EBAs with a 
focus on product market representation. This increases EBA density for two reasons. 
First, these reorganizations can allow EBAs to reduce membership fees because they 
can exploit economies of scale. Second, it allows the EBAs to incorporate each other’s 
specific interest representation expertise within the new joint EBA, thus being able to 
cater to a wider variety of employer’s needs. Therefore, it is proposed that 
reorganizations increase the density of EBAs (H6). 
 What EBAs do, i.e. their specific interest representation activities also play an 
important part in determining EBA density. Activities can help increase density when 
companies want to influence the collective goods that result from the activities or when 
the activities provide selective incentives to members of the association. In past studies 
(e.g., Traxler, 2004) it was argued that there exists a straightforward relationship 
between EBA activity and density. EBAs that engage in more activities, it was argued, 
realize higher densities. We therefore test the hypothesis that the more active the EBA, 
the higher its density (H7).  
However, recent studies (e.g., Brandl and Lehr, 2015) suggest that no such 
straightforward relationship exists been EBA activity and density. Rather, it seems 
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important to distinguish between the impact of specific EBA activities, as some may be 
more helpful than others, and some may actually be harmful. We argue that, within the 
context of increasing internationalization and competition, two activities in particular 
require attention: firstly, EBAs’ engagement in negotiating binding collective wage 
agreements and secondly, EBAs’ participation in conceptualization and implementation 
of public occupational training programs and active labour market policies. 
On EBA engagement in negotiating binding collective wage agreements, 
previous studies are adamant that this activity is the core task of EBAs and their 
survival is strongly linked to being able to fulfil this task (Traxler, 2004). Multi-
employer bargaining allows employers to effectively take wages out of inter-firm 
competition. This cartelizing effect offers strong incentives for companies to act 
collectively, as bargaining standard rates allows them to pass wage increases on to 
consumers and push less-productive, low-cost competitors out of the market. Based on 
this reasoning, one would expect that negotiating binding collective wage agreements 
has increased EBA density (H8a) 
We argue however, that while negotiating binding collective wage agreements 
may have had a positive influence on EBA density in some historical contexts, this does 
not necessarily hold for the period we analyse. This is because with increasing 
internationalization, multi-employer bargaining has lost its attraction. International 
competition has undermined the effectiveness of cartelizing efforts while being bound to 
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national, sector-specific wage-rates hampers the ability of companies to take advantage 
of opportunities in foreign markets. Moreover, the process of collective wage 
determination may be too protracted to adapt to the volatility of international markets. If 
such considerations factor with increasing prominence in companies evaluations of the 
need to join and EBA, or to maintain their membership, having to take binding wage 
agreements will be disincentive rather than an incentive. For these reasons, we offer the 
hypothesis that over time, negotiating binding collective wage agreements has 
decreased EBA density (H8b).  
 Turning to EBAs’ participation in public occupational training programs and 
labour market policies, we argue that economic openness also increases the rate of 
innovation, drives specialization and induces volatility in the labour-market. Employers 
consequently call for structural adjustments, in particular increases in the supply of 
adequately qualified and adaptable labour that can be called on in flexible arrangements. 
Active labour market and training programs which are conducted by state authorities are 
therefore of central importance for companies and countries as they help to overcome 
“skill boundaries” (e.g., Iversen and Cusack, 2000). In many countries, EBAs play an 
important part in initiating and guiding such adjustments through their participation in 
the conceptualization of training and active labour-market policies. Moreover, 
employers are an important partner in the implementation of these policies. By joining 
EBAs, companies gain access and influence over these policies which are of 
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fundamental importance for the provision of a skilled and trained workforce in many 
countries (e.g., Martin and Swank, 2004). We therefore propose that over time, 
participation in the conceptualization and implementation of public occupational 
training programs and active labour market policies has increased EBA density (H9).  
 There is of course a plethora of other activities by EBAs that may affect their 
density. Without formulating specific hypotheses, we also explore the impact of five: (i) 
negotiating binding collective agreement on non-wage issues; (ii) coordination of 
collective bargaining; and participation in the formulation and/or implementation of (iii) 
industrial policy; (iv) regional development; and (v) research and development 
programs.  
The hypotheses cover two main categories of relevant factors for the 
representativeness of EBAs. The first category includes contextual factors for both 
economic and industrial relations systems which are “exogenously” given for EBAs. 
These factors have changed over time and are hypothesized to affect representativeness 
of EBAs in distinct and different directions. EBAs have very limited or no influence on 
the changing contextual factors but they are able to address these factors by adapting 
their organizational structure and activities which are covered in the second category of 
intermediate factors. In the following empirical analysis we test both if the distinct 
contextual factors matter as well as whether EBAs were able to adjust their 
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organizational structure and activities in a way which enabled them to maintain their 
representativeness.  
 
Empirical analysis 
 
In the following empirical analysis, we test the above explanations of EBA 
density as our indicator of representativeness. We are interested in both the reasons for 
differences in the level of density across countries and the reasons for the development 
over time. Therefore we explicitly focus in separate analyses on the determinants of 
difference in levels and the changes of density. We expect these differences to be high 
for EBAs in different socio-economic systems according to the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach (i.e., Hall and Soskice, 2001) and in particular, according to different 
industrial relations systems (e.g., Bechter et al., 2012; European Commission, 2009). 
From each of the different systems a set of countries is chosen which also includes a 
differentiation between countries which differ with regard to their exposure to 
international markets. Denmark, Finland and Norway are selected from the ”Nordic” 
system, France, Italy and Spain from the “Mediterranean” system, Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland from the ”Continental European” system, and 
Ireland and the United Kingdom from the ”Liberal” system. Thus, the sample of 
countries and EBAs covers a wide range of EBAs which allows a relatively high degree 
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of generalization of the results. The country, i.e. peak EBAs, selection is based on the 
principle that significant differences in EBAs’ organisational and socio-economic 
environment can be identified and then compared regarding their implications on their 
representativeness. The analysis is held on a macro-level with cross sections formed by 
the different EBAs in the various countries. This implies that any arguments in the 
hypotheses discussed earlier which include reference to any micro- and meso-level 
reasoning are conceptualized for the macro-level with all its advantages and 
disadvantages (e.g., Collins, 1981).  
 We use data from a unique data set which includes information on these EBAs 
over the period from 1973-2012. The data set is based on a standardized expert 
questionnaire survey “Information about Business, Trade and Employers Organizations” 
(IBTEO) which continues and augments previous data collection efforts reported and 
documented in Traxler (2000, 2010). The IBTEO database was established in 1999 
based on data from the first round of responses from country experts. Further updates 
via new waves of data collection were made in the years 2004 and 2007. Using primary 
data based on information from national experts has various advantages. It offers much 
more precise and valid operationalizations of the variables of interest than existing 
secondary data, and the use of a consistent and homogenous standardized survey 
maximizes the comparability of the data across countries and years. There are also some 
disadvantages. The experts may look at EBAs through peculiarly national lenses or may 
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be uncertain about some information like for example past developments. Such issues 
with the validity of expert surveys are debated in literature (e.g., Budge, 2000; 
Steenbergen and Marks, 2007) and will be addressed accordingly in the empirical 
analysis by applying various robustness checks which test the effects of any possible 
inconsistency in specific cross sectional and time series data. In addition to the expert 
survey, secondary data provided by Carley (2010) and ILO (2010) was added. The most 
recent update of the IBTEO database was conducted in 2013.  
Although previous data bases on EBAs are integrated, some data for some 
countries is missing for some individual years (see the Appendix for further details). To 
account for this therefore in the following empirical analysis, (linear) interpolations for 
missing values were made and a periodization of data in four years intervals is used. 
Using four-year period averages has two main advantages for the data and research 
question in this study: first, it averages out the problem of any possible yearly outliers 
which might be caused by measurement errors and second, it averages out any yearly 
mismatch due to yearly missing values. Thus, using period averages enables the analysis 
of a relatively balanced panel with fewer missing values. The disadvantage however is 
that cross-section difference effects might be favoured, compared to period effects for 
which the time variation might have been averaged out, if outliers are not caused by 
measurement errors. As the data we are using here is not expected to vary significantly 
over time as is typical for this kind of data (e.g., Kittel, 1999), it would be highly 
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unlikely that any important time variation is missed because of the four-year 
periodization. 
With these data, we are able to analyse the determinants of EBA density in 
Western Europe on the basis of a wide range of different countries, which correspond 
with distinct systems of industrial relations, over a long time period which covers very 
distinct phases in European socio-economic development, with each phase challenging 
EBAs in distinct ways. Our analysis builds on the period-specific cross-section macro-
level approaches of density such as Traxler (2004) and the analysis of Brandl and Lehr 
(2015) in order to be able to compare our results. We present and discuss three models 
using a pooled time-series cross-section analysis. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation with panel-corrected standard errors to correct for the estimation problems 
typical of this type of data structure and with variables which show little variation over 
time (e.g., Beck and Katz, 1995).  
The nature and structure of the data makes it impossible (and effectively not 
necessary) to include country-specific (fixed/random) effects to control for other 
country characteristics. Given that EBA density rate is stable over time, country 
dummies reflect to a high degree the properties of the countries and it is impossible, and 
empirically and theoretically senseless, to test for any other further country influences 
with regard to the model we are using here. For further information and discussions 
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about the inclusion (or not) of country fixed effects for similar research questions see, 
for example, Greene (2011), and Plümper and Troeger (2007). 
In the following we are testing our hypotheses using models which are 
parsimonious in the sense that they are focused on the above hypotheses, but are still 
more elaborated and fine grained than previous quantitative analyses (e.g., Brandl, 
2013; Brandl and Lehr, 2015; Martin and Swank, 2004; Traxler, 2010). 
 Before we turn to the estimated models, we briefly discuss the variables entered 
in the regression equations. “Economic growth” captures and controls cross-country and 
over time differences in the economic environment. “Openness” reflects the exposure of 
companies in each country to the global economy. “Extension” indicates if collective 
agreements are extended to non-members or not. “Union density” is the measure for the 
strength of trade unions in a country. “Reorganization” indicates if the EBA undertook 
an organizational change either by an enlargement of its domain and/or by any merger 
with another association. The “activity index” is the aggregate of principal activities 
carried out by the EBA, summarizing its overall level of activity. To allow us to 
distinguish between their potentially confounding impacts, each activity is also 
considered separately. “Fragmentation” expresses the number of confederations and also 
controls for changes in the domain of EBAs in countries. Two dummy variables for 
Germany and Italy are included in all estimated models to control for structural breaks 
in the time-series for the two countries. As the Confederation of German Employers’ 
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Association is the only “pure” employer association (left) in Western Europe, a further 
dummy variable for this special case was tested in order to analyse robustness, which 
did not reveal any difference in the results. These variables correspond directly to the 
above set of hypotheses and enable us to test a parsimonious specification so that a high 
estimation quality can be guaranteed, even though further determinants such as the 
average company size, the predominant skill level and other characteristics of EBAs’ 
constituents might be interesting to analyse. However, as we are analysing 
encompassing peak organizations which are cross-sectoral and cover a wide variety of 
companies, we do not expect the latter company characteristics to matter very much for 
the research question here, so that our parsimonious model includes the main 
determinants. A detailed report on the operationalization and measurement of variables 
used in the analysis is provided in the Appendix (Table 2). 
  In the following sections, we report and discuss on three models. Model 1 
regresses the observed level of EBA density for each country and interval on Economic 
growth, Openness, Extension, Union density, the interaction between Extension and 
Union density, the Activity index and Fragmentation. This model is explicitly designed 
to explain differences in density across countries. Model 2 is explicitly designed to 
focus on the analysis of the determinants of change of density over time. It follows a 
similar specification to model 1 but regresses the independent variables on the change in 
density, i.e. taking the first-difference of the dependent variable. This model excludes 
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the interaction term and the Fragmentation variable for reasons explained in detail 
below. Model 3 is identical to Model 2 except that the Activity index is excluded in 
favour of estimating the effects of each activity separately. The models tested and 
shown enable a test of all our theoretical considerations discussed in the earlier sections. 
Although we are able to test our hypotheses on a data set which is significantly larger 
and thus more reliable than all previous studies on EBAs, statistical limitations must be 
considered so that parsimonious specifications were targeted. E.g. for reasons of 
parsimony, we have not estimated the interaction of Extension and Union density for 
model 2 and model 3. Alternative specifications were also investigated because of 
statistical limitations and in order to test the robustness of the models, which all confirm 
the results here. In the context of the relevance of union density as a predictor for EBAs 
density, it can be noted that this result of the insignificance of union density holds even 
in specifications which do not consider an interaction effect. Additionally, a bootstrap 
analysis similar to Traxler (2010) was made to check any validity problems in the data 
which confirms the robustness. The results of our analyses are presented in Table 1. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
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In discussing the results shown in Table 1, we begin the elaboration with the impact of 
contextual factors and then move to the intermediate variables related to the structure 
and activities of EBAs.  
 On our first hypotheses regarding economic openness, competing hypotheses 
proposing both a negative and a positive relationship were offered. Our analyses show 
no evidence in favour of the hypothesis that openness decreases EBA density (H1a). On 
the contrary, we find that density levels are higher where there is more openness (H1b). 
However, economic openness is not a statistically significant predictor of changes in 
density. This latter finding is a consequence of relatively low over-time variation 
compared to relatively high between-country variation of this variable. In other words, 
countries differ in their degree of economic openness over a long time period and for 
many ”structural” reasons, i.e. small countries are usually (much) more open than larger 
countries. As for example, the size and structure of countries is usually very stable over 
time, the openness of economies does not explain any variation over time but 
differences in the levels between countries. Of course, openness changes, i.e. it 
increases, over time, but this increase is a common characteristic of all countries. 
Previous analyses suggested that openness has no effect on density. Our results suggest 
that an effect does exist and is in fact positive. The consequential explanation for this 
result is that EBAs must have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by 
economic openness to increase membership arising from economic internationalization 
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by representing the specific array of needs among (potential) member companies. There 
are many ways of representing the needs of companies because of internationalization, 
e.g. helping companies to enter new/foreign markets as well as pushing training and 
skills development programs of companies by participation in relevant public policy 
initiatives. The latter activity in particular will be discussed later in detail.   
 On economic growth, we find no evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
density is negatively associated with economic growth (H2), as the estimated 
coefficients are not statistically significant in any of the models. This result suggests 
that EBAs cannot increase density in times of economic decline but that they are not 
adversely affected by economic hardship either. 
 On hypothesis H3 in accord with previous studies, we find that the existence of 
extension practices has a large and positive effect on the level of density. As this 
variable does not vary significantly over time in countries, it is not surprising that 
changes in density are not associated with it. However, contrary to previous studies, i.e. 
Traxler (2004), we find no evidence that EBA density is high when union density is 
high (H4), nor for the interaction hypothesis that this effect reverses its direction in the 
presence of extension practices (H5). Considering the diverging trends in the fortunes of 
EBAs and trade unions, it makes sense that union density is no longer a good predictor 
of EBA density.  
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 Fragmentation was hypothesized to be associated with high density (H6). This 
hypothesis is supported by our findings, which are similar to previous research. 
However, because over time, changes to fragmentation and reorganizations co-vary 
highly, identification problems arise for the models predicting change in density. We 
have therefore excluded the effect of fragmentation from model 2 and model 3. The 
intermediate variable Reorganizations is expected to increase density (H7). This is 
supported by the estimates in model 2 and model 3, where we find a positive and 
significant effect of reorganizations on the change in EBA density.  
 Finally, we discuss the impact of organizational activities on density. We tested 
the general hypothesis that the more active EBAs are, i.e. the more EBAs are doing 
overall, the higher their density (H8). Even though this positive relationship might be 
considered self-evident, our results indicate that this is not necessarily the case and an 
in-depth look into the different activities of EBAs must be undertaken. This is because 
we find no significant effect of the activity variable on both the level of density (model 
1) and the change in density (model 2). In a nutshell, the first intuitive implication that 
could be drawn is that for EBAs, membership numbers are not affected by whether they 
are doing more or less on behalf of companies. However, a more detailed investigation 
of the different and manifold activities has to be undertaken. 
Significantly , our estimates for model 3, which includes different activities of 
EBAs as separate explanatory variables, offers a clear explanation for the absence of 
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such an intuitive effect. As it turns out, different activities may have dramatically 
different effects on density. Indeed, a “simple” aggregation of activities is evidently a 
much too imprecise analysis and measurement. For instance, against the assumption that 
EBA’s density depends on their bargaining of binding collective wage agreements, we 
proposed the hypothesis that over time, this activity decreased density (H9). Our results 
offer support for this proposition: density is indeed found to decrease when EBAs 
negotiate binding wage agreements as companies are no longer “willing” to accept 
collective wage agreements and prefer to strike collective wage agreements by 
themselves or prefer to have no wage agreements at all. In contrast, negotiating binding 
collective agreements on non-wage issues is found to increase density as a result of the 
increasing need of employers for assistance in employment and work related practices 
aimed at increasing the flexibility and qualifications of the workforce, such as life-long-
learning and work-life balance programs. This result however, supports the hypothesis 
that non-wage agreements have become increasingly important at the expense of wage 
agreements. Such an interpretation is also in accord with the hypothesis that EBA 
participation in the formulation and implementation of public occupational training 
programs and active labour market policies increases density (H10), for which we find 
support. In fact, this result confirms that active labour market and training programs 
which are conducted by state authorities are of central importance for companies as they 
help to overcome “skill boundaries” which many companies face. Consequently, the 
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participation of EBAs in this public policy area offers a major incentive to companies to 
become members in order to gain access and influence active labour market and training 
programs. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we addressed the question of how to explain the representativeness of 
Employer and business associations (EBAs) by analysing the density of the largest peak 
EBAs in 13 Western European countries between 1973 and 2012. The question holds 
particular relevance for two reasons. First, common theoretical reasoning suggests that 
EBA density is expected to decline due to socio-economic trends, in particular 
globalization and the weakening of trade unions. Second, collective action theory 
indicates that it would be difficult to realize substantial levels of EBA density in the first 
place. Yet empirical evidence shows that EBAs are encompassing organizations which 
are highly representative, and despite changing socio-economic trends, continue to be 
so.  
 In order to understand this puzzle, we developed a theoretical approach that sees 
EBAs as fundamentally dynamic and adaptable, rather than static and rigid. Thus we 
hypothesized that EBAs maintain and even increase their representativeness by 
successfully taking advantage of changing socio-economic conditions, in particular 
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economic openness and economic hardship. Furthermore, we hypothesized that EBAs 
do this by adapting their organizational structure and activities, particularly by 
undertaking mergers and shifting from binding collective wage bargaining towards 
involvement in occupational training programs and active labour market policies.  
Our findings mostly support this theoretical approach. We found no evidence for 
the negative relationship between economic growth and representativeness we 
hypothesized. However, as hypothesized by us and in stark contrast to previous 
theoretical reasoning, economic openness is associated with higher EBA 
representativeness. A similar situation applies to our findings regarding the impact of 
EBA activities. Previous studies (e.g., Traxler, 2004) argued that involvement in binding 
collective wage bargaining is a vital function of EBA to “survive”, whereas our findings 
support our hypothesis that the involvement in binding collective wage bargaining has 
actually decreased EBA density in the period studied. The explanation for this result 
was found by the decreasing need and interest in collective wage agreements of 
companies in the last decades because the institutional environment changed in a way 
that it enabled companies to bargain their own wage agreements with trade unions and 
they expect to be able to bargain more favourable wage agreements without the 
involvement of EBAs.  
Our hypothesis that involvement in occupational training programs and active 
labour market policies would increase EBA density was supported. Furthermore, we 
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find that changes to EBAs organizational structures through mergers indeed increases 
EBA density. We can draw the conclusion therefore that non-merging is likely to be an 
explanation for a decrease in EBA density which is supported by the membership 
development of the Confederation of German Employers’ Association (e.g., Behrens 
and Helfen, 2009) which is the only ‘pure’ employers association left in Western 
Europe. Furthermore, we tested a number of hypotheses advanced in previous studies, 
with some novel findings. In line with previous studies, we find that the presence of 
extension practices is associated with higher EBA density. Yet we also find that trade 
union density is no longer a significant predictor of EBA density.  
In summary, our study shows that in order to understand how EBAs have 
retained their representativeness while trade unions have struggled, it is important to 
recognise the flexibility EBAs enjoy in changing their structure and activities, which 
has allowed them to take advantage of changing socio-economic circumstances. As a 
matter of fact, EBAs managed the manifold challenges so well that it seems they 
escaped the “fate” of their “counterparts” on the labour market, i.e. trade unions. For the 
latter organizations as well as for corporatism in general, a similar “creeping death” was 
often predicted (e.g., Crouch, 2011; Molina and Rhodes, 2002). Although corporatism 
has reinvented itself continuously and is still strong in many countries and trade unions 
are still alive, their “strengths” have faded significantly in the recent past and it is 
uncertain if and how they might recover (e.g., Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 
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2013). It is, of course, uncertain what the fate of the “counter-organization” of EBAs 
will be but currently it is clear that, rather than being a relic, EBAs have adjusted and 
remain alive and kicking. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Description/details Source 
Activity Aggregate index of associational activities: negotiates 
and signs on behalf of its affiliates binding collective 
wage agreements; negotiates and signs on behalf of its 
affiliates binding collective non-wage agreements, i.e. 
agreements on non-wage issues; coordinates collective 
bargaining of affiliates; participates in the formulation 
and/or involved in the implementation of public 
industrial policy programs; participates in the 
formulation and/or involved in the implementation of 
public regional development programs; participates in 
the formulation and/or involved in the implementation 
of public occupational training programs (including 
apprenticeship) and active labor market policy; 
participates in the formulation and/or involved in the 
implementation of public research and development 
programs; represents members’ labor-market interests in 
various corporatist institutions. 
IBTEO 
Economic growth Annual logarithmic change of real Gross Domestic 
Product 
AMECO 
(2015) 
Employer density Density of the largest employer peak organization. 
Percentage of employees organized by the peak 
organization within its domain. 
IBTEO 
Extension Practice of extending multi-employer agreements to 
non-member companies. Dichotomous: 1 = moderate 
and pervasive practice; 0 = no notable extension 
practice. 
IBTEO 
Fragmentation Number of Employers’ confederations Visser 
(2015) 
Germany Dummy variable (structural break) for German 
unification 
IBTEO 
Italy 
 
Dummy variable (structural break) for Italy (2005 
onwards) 
IBTEO 
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Openness Annual change of average share of imports and exports 
of goods in world trade. 
AMECO 
(2015) 
Reorganization Domain changes of associations: Merger activity by 
simple numerical concentration of the associational 
system, i.e. a reduction of the number independent 
associations) or in numerical and functional 
concentration. Usually merger of employers’ 
associations towards mixed EBAs.  
IBTEO 
Union density 
 
Trade union density, i.e. net union membership as a 
proportion wage and salary earners in employment  
Visser 
(2015) 
Notes: In the analyses period averages as well as interpolated values (linear) for missing 
values between available data are used. Periods: 1973-1976, 1977-1980, 1981-1984, 
1985-1988, 1989-1992, 1993-1996, 1997-2000, 2001-2004, 2005-2008, 2009-2012. 
Missing values: France, Netherlands, and United Kingdom 1973-1988; Belgium, and 
Spain 1973-1996; Ireland 1973-2008; Germany 2005-2012; Finland 1973-1984 and 
2001-2012.  
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Tables/Figures 
  
 
Note: For details on missing values and data sources see Table 2 in the Appendix. 
Boxplots show the distribution of densities observed for each country for 1973 to 2012. 
The bars within the shaded boxes represent the median density observed within each 
country in this period, the bottoms and tops of the boxes coincide with the first, 
respectively third quartile. The “whiskers” represent the lowest and highest observations 
for those countries where no observations are 1.5*interquartile range (IQR) above the 
third quartile or 1.5*IQR below the first quartile. For countries where such observations 
are present, the “whiskers” represent the values 1.5*IQR above the third quartile and/or 
1.5*IQR below the first quartile and the observations lying outside this range are 
marked with a dot. 
Figure 1. Employers and business associations’ density in 13 countries 
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Note: For details on missing values and data sources see Table 2 in the Appendix. Lines 
represent the observed developments of density (smoothed). Ireland is omitted from 
Figure 2 because there are no observations for this country prior to the 2009-2012 
period.    
Figure 2. The development of employers and business associations’ density, 1973-2012 
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Table 1. The determinants of the representativeness of employers’ and business 
associations across countries and time 
Dependent variable:  Level  Change 
Employer density (1)  (2) (3) 
Economic growth -25.876 
(28.039) 
 
1.696 
(12.635) 
-0.675 
(13.088) 
OpennessΔ 1.669* 
(0.729) 
 
0.418 
(1.230) 
0.622 
(1.069) 
Extension 22.190** 
(6.634) 
 
-0.420 
(1.452) 
-0.219 
(1.332) 
Union densityΔ -0.033 
(0.109) 
 
0.491 
(0.256) 
0.390 
(0.224) 
Extension*Union density -0.046 
(0.139) 
 - - 
Reorganization 2.920 
(5.230) 
 
3.315* 
(1.287) 
3.466** 
(1.201) 
Activity indexΔ -0.142 
(0.073) 
 
-0.029 
(0.041) 
- 
   Collective wage agreements  
-  - 
-7.107* 
(3.375) 
   Collective non-wage agreements 
-  - 
5.379* 
(2.546) 
   Coordinates collective bargaining 
-  - 
-1.797 
(2.306) 
   Industrial policy  
-  - 
2.333 
(1.216) 
   Regional development 
-  - 
-3.353 
(1.810) 
   Training and active labor market 
-  - 
6.845* 
(2.631) 
   Research and development 
-  - 
-2.690 
(1.599) 
Fragmentation 1.547* 
(0.595) 
 - - 
Germany -13.942 
(7.376) 
 
4.570* 
(2.109) 
3.095 
(2.076) 
Italy -22.836* 
(9.004) 
 
-12.920* 
(5.260) 
-12.373** 
(4.586) 
Constant 49.907** 
(5.534) 
 
-0.941 
(1.271) 
-1.201 
(1.326) 
R2 0.607  0.238 0.395 
N x T 79  69 69 
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Notes: Δ Indicates that yearly change of independent variable is used to explain yearly change of 
dependent variable. Estimation according to Beck and Katz (1995): Pooled time-series cross-
section analysis with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. **α ≤ .01; * α ≤ .05. N x T: 
number of observations (missings excluded). Austria is excluded from the sample/analysis here 
because of the obligatory membership for companies. For abbreviations and variable 
definitions, see Table 2 in the Appendix.  
